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INTRODUCTION 
 Both auditors and credit rating agencies have been linked to 
financial scandals in recent history.  In the early 2000’s, several of the “big 
five” accounting firms issued favorable audit opinions to public companies 
employing deceptive accounting practices.  Some of these companies even 
committed outright fraud.  Once the investing public caught wind of these 
accounting irregularities, it lost trust in the auditing industry, companies’ 
financial statements, and the financial market as a whole. 
 Today, we face a new financial crisis and have found a new party to 
blame.  When we discuss the current financial crisis, talk of the credit 
rating agencies is usually not far behind.  These agencies issued notoriously 
favorable credit ratings to thousands of subprime residential mortgage-
based securities and related financial instruments.  However, once the 
housing bubble burst and interest rates rose, these financial instruments 
proved to be toxic investments.  As the credit rating agencies downgraded 
the instruments, the public lost trust in the credit rating industry, credit 
ratings, and once again, the financial market as a whole. 
 At first glance, it appears that similar problems with auditors and 
credit rating agencies contributed to both financial crises.  Foremost, both 
the auditing and the credit rating industries were premised on 
independence.  However, over time the two industries faced external 
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pressures that changed the way they did business.  Today, both industries 
employ the client-pays model, where clients write checks directly to their 
auditors and credit rating agencies in exchange for evaluations.  
Additionally, both pre-Sarbanes-Oxley auditors and credit rating agencies 
market ancillary services to their audit and credit rating clients, 
respectively.  These conditions create the potential for conflicts of interest. 
 In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to regulate the 
auditing industry and, in turn, prevent future accounting scandals and any 
financial crises which might arise.  The Act increased oversight, prohibited 
auditors from providing most ancillary services to audit clients, and 
outlawed certain relationships between auditors and their audit clients.  For 
the most part, Sarbanes-Oxley successfully eliminated the conflicts of 
interest that had plagued the auditing industry and played a large role in the 
financial crisis at the beginning of the century. 
 Unlike the auditing industry, the credit rating industry does not need 
formal governmental regulation to solve the problems it faces.  While 
conflicts of interest were large contributors to the accounting scandals, the 
same conflicts do not pose large threats to the credit rating agencies.  It is 
true that, at first glance, the credit rating industry might appear to face 
major conflicts of interest.  However, the credit rating agencies have 
actually maintained their independence.  The client-pays model does not 
tempt credit rating agencies to inflate ratings based on the improper 
influences of clients.  Furthermore, ancillary services are a nonissue 
because they contribute to an insignificant fraction of the credit rating 
agencies’ total revenue.  Finally, credit rating agencies have firewalls and 
self-regulations in place to prevent any conflicts of interest from negatively 
impacting the integrity of their rating processes. 
 Due in large part to the reputational capital model, credit rating 
agencies have decided to self-regulate, which has proven effective.  
Consequently, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s amendment of 
the Exchange Act of 1934 to increase formal governmental regulation over 
the credit rating agencies was unnecessary and possibly harmful.  Instead 
of regulating credit rating agencies, the SEC would do better to more 
closely regulate the securities that the credit rating agencies rate. 
 Part II of this comment provides an overview of the current financial 
crisis.  Part III discusses the financial crisis generated by Enron, Arthur 
Andersen, and other accounting scandals.  Part IV of this comment 
examines how Sarbanes-Oxley changed the auditing industry by increasing 
oversight and eliminating opportunities for conflicts of interest.  Part V 
compares and contrasts the conflicts of interest in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley 
auditing and the credit rating industries.  Part VI explains why formal 
governmental regulation, including the 2008 Amendments to Rule 17g of 
the Exchange Act, is not only unnecessary, but potentially harmful.  
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Finally, Part VII draws conclusions from the analysis presented below. 
II.  The Current Financial Crisis 
 In 2008, events unfolded which prevented the world from remaining 
blind to the problems that had been brewing for years.  First, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York pulled Bear Stearns back from the brink of 
bankruptcy by assuming $30 billion in liabilities and arranging a sale to 
JPMorgan Chase.1  Next, the Treasury Department took control of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac after the stock prices of these two government-
sponsored enterprises dramatically declined.  Soon thereafter, Lehman 
Brothers declared bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch sold itself to Bank of 
America, and the federal government bailed out American International 
Group (“AIG”) for $85 billion.  At the same time, stock prices plummeted2 
and foreclosure rates soared.3 
 As the world watched the financial crisis unfold during the summer 
months of 2008, credit rating agencies4 (“CRAs”) became a hot topic of 
conversation in the media, academia, and politics.  Many began to blame 
the economic downturn on the CRAs, arguing that the CRAs did a horrible 
job rating a novel financial instrument:  subprime residential mortgage-
backed securities.5 
 
 1. Credit Crisis – The Essentials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at C1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. “Real estate foreclosures in the U.S. were up 81 percent in 2008 and up 225 percent 
from 2006.”  2008 Foreclosure Rates, CBSNEWS (2008), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/elements/ 2008/02/12/business/map3823166.shtml. 
 4. A CRA is a for-profit company that evaluates financial instruments and obligations 
to determine the likelihood of default on repayment.  To accomplish this task, a CRA issues 
a rating that represents the CRA’s current opinion of the creditworthiness of the issuer or the 
actual financial instrument.  These ratings are based on a letter scale.  Moody’s uses “Aaa” 
as its highest rating, followed by “Aa,” “A,” Baa,” “Ba,” “B,” “Caa,” and so on.  JEROME S. 
FONS, UNDERSTANDING MOODY’S CORPORATE BOND RATINGS AND RATING PROCESS 7, 
(Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.) (2002).  Fitch uses an “AAA” rating for the highest credit 
quality, followed by “AA,” “A,” and “BBB,” with “D” designating an instrument that has 
defaulted on its obligations.  Fitch Rating Definitions, FITCHRATINGS ¶ 3(2009), 
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/fitchResources.cfm?detail=1.  Standard & Poor’s 
rating definitions resemble Fitch’s definitions.  Insurer Financial Strength Rating 
Definitions, STANDARD & POOR’S 1-2 (The McGraw Hill Companies) (2002).  Each of the 
three CRAs then modifies their letter ratings with numbers or plus or minus signs.  A CRA 
determines creditworthiness by considering the cash-flow risk of underlying assets and the 
creditworthiness of guarantors, insurers, and other forms of credit enhancement of the 
obligation.  Methodology:  The Interaction of Bond Insurance and Credit Ratings, CRITERIA 
ARTICLE 2 (Standard & Poor’s) (2007), 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/4,5,5,1,1204833924205.
html. 
 5. Securities, in general, are created by first pooling income-producing financial assets 
together.  The cash flows from these pools are then divided into different classes, called 
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A.  Subprime Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities and Their Role in the 
Current Financial Crisis 
 Subprime residential mortgage-based securities (“subprime RMBS”) 
are a specific type of mortgaged-backed securities.  While mortgage-
backed securities and, more specifically, residential mortgage-backed 
securities (“RMBS”),6 have been around for decades,7 subprime RMBS are 
a recent invention.  Subprime RMBS are unique because they are 
comprised of mortgages that demand very little money upfront, mortgages 
that require very small interest payments in the first few years, and 
mortgages that are issued by borrowers who likely would never qualify for 
home loans under traditional mortgage requirements.  Until recently, these 
types of mortgages had never been issued in mass quantities nor had they 
been securitized.  Consequently, subprime RMBS had been tested neither 
in a boom nor a bust economy. 
 In addition to the novelty of the subprime RMBS, the securities 
industry itself recently began changing.  Today, securitization regularly 
occurs via private companies with “looser practices and little or no 
government regulation,” unlike in the past when government-created 
companies subject to a high degree of governmental oversight created the 
securities.8  Additionally, the securitization of mortgages became more 
prevalent than ever before.  While in 1999 less than twenty percent of all 
U.S. mortgages were securitized, in 2005 and 2006 the private sector 
securitized almost two-thirds of all U.S. mortgages.9  These features of 
 
tranches or tiers.  Losses from defaults on the underlying income-producing financial assets 
are allocated to each tranche strategically in order to create different risk exposure for each 
tranche.  This process yields diverse investments with diverse risk profiles.  Losses are first 
assigned to junior tranches, then mezzanine tranches, and finally to senior tranches as each 
respective tranche is exhausted.  These investments are sold to different investors based on 
the expected return and risk.  John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the 
“Worldwide Credit Crisis”:  The Limits of Reputation, The Insufficiency of Reform, and a 
Proposal for Improvement, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 117-18 (2009). 
 6. The main advantage of mortgage securitization is that the process allows lenders to 
sell their long-term accounts receivable, thereby increasing liquidity.  Lenders can then use 
this increased liquidity to make more loans to homeowners and the general public. 
 7. The first residential mortgage-based securities were sold in 1970.  Statement of 
America’s Community Bankers on Protecting Homeowners:  Preventing Abusive Lending 
While Preserving Access to Credit:  Hearing Before the H. Subcomms. on Housing and 
Community Opportunity and on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Comm. 
on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Cameron L. Cowan, Partner, 
Orrick, Herrington, and Sutcliffe). 
 8. Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite? KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, 
Dec. 10, 2008, at 2, available at 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2112. 
 9. David Goldstein & Kevin G. Hall, Private Sector Loans, not Fannie or Freddie, 
Triggered Crisis, MCCLATCHY WASHINGTON BUREAU, Oct. 12, 2008, available at 
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subprime RMBS and the securities industry made it difficult not only to 
predict how these securities would fair in a healthy market, but also to 
predict how they would react in an economic downturn.10 
 In addition to subprime RMBS’s unpredictability, they are difficult 
to price due to the manner in which they are offered and sold.  Subprime 
RMBS are a type of collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”), meaning that 
they may be offered and sold under Rule 144A of the Federal Securities 
Act of 1933.11  Such instruments escape the strict marketing and sales 
restrictions of Section 5 of the Securities Act to which typical publicly 
offered securities are subject.12  Consequently, the issuers in a Rule 144A 
offering need not make as much information available to investors or to the 
SEC.  This leaves investors with only two options for valuing the offered 
CDOs:  do their own research or rely on readily available information.  
Because doing one’s own research is costly and time-consuming, it was 
logical for investors to pursue the latter option with regards to the subprime 
RMBS and thus rely heavily upon the CRAs’ ratings of the subprime 
RMBS. 
 However, the CRAs were in a similar position as the investors - they 
had never seen anything like the subprime RMBS before.  The issuers 
added to this problem by creating even more complex financial instruments 
out of the subprime RMBS by grouping, dividing, shifting around, and 
tranching the securities into multi-sector CDOs (“CDOs2”) and other 
opaque instruments.  Nevertheless, seeing the fees they could earn by rating 
the instruments, the CRAs developed models and issued ratings anyway. 
These ratings were generally very favorable, and the innovative 
financial instruments sold well.13  Those who purchased the subprime 
RMBS excitedly held on to these new profit opportunities.  Banks relished 
their newfound ability to move the mortgages off of their balance sheets 
and increase their liquidity.  Bank equity holders marveled at high returns 
on equity.  Homeowners enjoyed their new residences with low mortgage 
interest rates and the belief that they would realized huge gains upon 
 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/251/v-print/story/53802.html. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Hunt, supra note 5, at 117-19. 
 12. A 144A offering memoranda is first prepared without pricing terms.  Then the 
COD’s underwriter markets the offering and, once the issuing entity and the underwriter 
agree on a price, that price is inserted into a final offering memorandum.  The underwriter 
subsequently buys the securities from the issuing entity at a price below that listed on the 
final offering memorandum.  Finally, the underwriter immediately resells the securities at 
the offering price listed in the final offering memorandum.  Rule 144A Offerings – A 
Summary, AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD, L.L.P. (1997), http://library.findlaw.com 
/1999/Jan/1/129383.pdf. 
 13. Investors required by law or policy to own only top-rated securities especially found 
these high ratings attractive.  KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, supra note 8, at 2. 
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subsequent resale.  And, like everyone else, the CRAs profited from these 
marvelous new financial instruments as they pocketed the fees for their 
ratings. 
B.  The Housing Bubble and its Part in the Current Financial Crisis 
 For a while, everything seemed peachy.  Everyone who was 
remotely involved with the subprime RMBS appeared to be striking gold.  
But these financial dealings did not exist in a vacuum.  The subprime 
RMBS could only continue their success so long as the housing market 
remained strong, and by 2008, the housing bubble was set to burst. 
 The housing bubble began inflating in the beginning of this 
millennium.  One factor that pumped up the bubble was the low interest 
rates that remained even after the dot-com crash of 2000 seemed like a 
distant memory.14  These low interest rates contributed to high liquidity and 
increased borrowing.  Also thanks to the dot-com crash, Americans began 
to view residential real estate as the wisest investment they could make.15  
Presidents George H.W. Bush16 and Bill Clinton17 enforced this belief by 
emphasizing the role which homeownership played in the “American 
Dream.” 
 In addition to the low interest rates and the appeal of 
homeownership, a new form of borrowing—the subprime mortgage—
fueled the increasing demand for houses.18  This elevated demand for 
 
 14. After the dot-com crash and the 2001–2003 recession, the Federal Reserve lowered 
short-term interest rates from approximately 6.5% to 1%.  Mortgage interest rates also 
dropped.  Vasso P. Ioannidou et al., The Impact of Short-Term Interest Rates on Risk-
Taking:  Hard Evidence, VOX, Oct. 17, 2007, http://www. 
voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/641. 
 15. Buying into the housing market appeared to be a safer investment than buying into 
the stock market because average national home prices had not dropped between the end of 
the Great Depression and the recent housing bubble burst.  Beth Belton, Housing Bubble – 
or Bunk?, BUSINESSWEEK, June 22, 2005, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jun2005/nf20050622_9404_db008.htm.  
The image of real estate being a safe bet was magnified in 2000 when the dot-com bubble 
burst and the NASDAQ dropped dramatically. 
 16. President George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Arrival in Appleton, Wisconsin (July 27, 
1992) (“Part of the American dream is owning your own home”), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=21270. 
 17. Bill Clinton commented that homeownership is "an essential part of the American 
dream we're working hard to restore.”  President William J. Clinton, (radio broadcast Feb. 
27, 1993), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=46253. 
 18. A subprime mortgage is “a type of loan granted to individuals with poor credit 
histories (often below 600), who, as a result of their deficient credit ratings, would not be 
able to qualify for conventional mortgages.”  What is a Subprime Mortgage?, 2009, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/07/subprime-mortgage.asp.  
Subprime mortgages often involve “teaser rates,” or low up-front interest rates that later 
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houses both truly and artificially, raised home prices; over fewer than ten 
years, the price of the average American home increased by more than 45 
percent.19  The supply chain reacted to the booming demand and big price 
tags by building more homes.  And as the supply of houses increased, 
builders made homes grander, and subsequently more expensive, in order 
to differentiate their products.  Thus, home prices continued to soar. 
 During the same period, the Federal Reserve began raising interest 
rates.  After a dozen adjustments, the Fed stopped at 5.25% in August 
2006.20  The higher interest rate decreased the supply of money and made 
borrowing less attractive.  The Fed was not the only one to raise interest 
rates; subprime mortgages with low teaser rates began to show their true 
colors by charging homeowners higher rates. 
 With the supply of houses, the cost of houses, the cost of borrowing, 
and the required payments on subprime mortgages all rising concurrently, 
the housing bubble was set to burst.  It was not long before more and more 
homeowners found themselves in over their heads.  Bankruptcy offered no 
help,21 and the securitized subprime mortgages were almost impossible to 
renegotiate.22  Consequently, homeowners who were unable to make their 
monthly payments began defaulting on their mortgages, driving up 
foreclosure rates across America.23 
 The spike in foreclosures had two direct effects.  First, it increased 
the supply of houses on the market.  Second, homeowners and investors 
lost confidence in the housing market.  As a result, the demand for houses 
began to fall.  This, in turn, caused prices to decline.  The decline in prices 
snowballed because a home foreclosure lowers the value of the other 
houses in close proximity to a foreclosed property.  Thus, between 2006 
and 2007, the median value of a new home fell from $247,000 to 
$231,000.24  By December 2008, the median value dropped to $175,400.25  
 
increase. 
 19. After adjusting for inflation.  DEAN BAKER, THE HOUSING BUBBLE FACT SHEET 1 
(Center for Economic anc Policy Research) (2005), 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ housing_fact_2005_07.pdf.  Contrast this with 
the price increase between 1950 and 1995, when home price growth was no greater than the 
growth for other goods or services.  Id. 
 20. Krishna Guha and Jennifer Hughes, Fed Holds Rates for First Time in Two Years, 
FIN. TIMES, ¶ 1 (2006), http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/InfoWeb. 
 21. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)(2006) (disallowing the modification of the rights of the 
holders of claims secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s 
principal residence); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3)(2006) (providing for the curing or waiving of 
any default). 
 22. Anna Gelpern and Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts:  Workout 
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (2009). 
 23. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 24. MEDIAN AND AVERAGE PRICES OF NEW HOMES SOLD IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2, 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census), available at http://www.census.gov/const/uspriceann.pdf. 
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These low values created a vicious cycle of foreclosures because 
homeowners who owed more on their mortgages than their equity in their 
houses had little reason not to default and move on with their lives.  As so 
many mortgages went unpaid, holders of RMBS began to wonder where 
the return on their investments had gone. 
C.  The Impacts of Defaults and the Popping of the Housing Bubble 
 Defaults and foreclosures on Main Street soon impacted Wall Street.  
The mortgage defaults equated to a lack of cash flow to the CDO2s and the 
lower tranches of CDOs.  The CRAs responded to the lack of cash flow by 
downgrading thousands of subprime RMBS.26  As the credit ratings fell, so 
too did investors’ confidence in the financial instruments.27  Investors 
began selling the subprime RMBS due to fear of market illiquidity,28 
leading to a modern day bank run.  Banks were forced to sell off their 
assets at fire-sale prices in order to meet liquidity demands.  This, in turn, 
caused the securities to look even uglier than they did before.  Subprime 
RMBS were soon labeled “toxic waste”29 that could not be sold quickly 
enough. 
 Subprime RMBS were not the only assets that investors were 
anxious to sell.  Because his primary residence generally constitutes an 
individual’s largest investment and source of wealth, that individual faces 
greatly reduced equity when the market value of his house drops below his 
purchase price or the value of his mortgage.  Many individuals found 
themselves in this situation in 2007 and 2008, causing them to panic and 
sell whatever stocks they owned, even with stock prices already depressed. 
Today, housing prices continue to decline and sales remain weak.30  
 
 25. Kelly Evans, Home Prices, Sentiment Keep Sliding, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at 
A3. 
 26. In just the first quarter of 2008, CRAs announced 4,485 downgrades of 
collateralized debt obligations.  Dena Aubin, CDO Deals Resurface But Down 90 Pct in Q1-
Report, REUTERS UK (2008), http://uk.reuters.com/article/marketsNewsUS. 
 27. As mentioned above, investors heavily relied on the ratings for these securities 
because they were not traded in a transparent market.  TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, CONSULTATION REPORT:  THE 
ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS *5 (International 
Organization of Securities Commissions) (2008), available at 
http://www.treasurers.org/node/3138. 
 28. Id. 
 29. William H. Gross, Investment Outlook:  Looking for Contagion in All the Wrong 
Places, PIMCO (2007), http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/ 
IO/2007/ IO+July+2007.htm. 
 30. Jon Ward, Obama Heralds Housing Market Improvements, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
2009, available at http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/23/obama-heralds-housing-
market-improvements/ (explaining effect of Americans taking advantage of low interest 
rates). 
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Americans now face the “biggest crisis since the Great Depression.”31  
Investment banks have fallen or reorganized, the federal government has 
seized control of the country’s biggest insurance company and savings and 
loan association, and “[t]he channels of credit, the arteries of the global 
financial system, have been constricted, cutting off crucial funds to 
consumers and businesses . . . .”32  During the shortest month in 2009, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped to a six-year low,33 President 
Barack Obama signed into law a $787 billion stimulus plan34 in the hopes 
of pulling America out of the current financial crisis, and Americans are 
left wondering who they can blame for this mess. 
III.  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF RECENT HISTORY AND THE ROLE OF 
AUDITORS 
 In recent history, America faced another financial crisis that 
similarly raised doubts about the health and integrity of our financial 
markets.  In the first years of the new millennium, it was uncovered that 
several mammoth international corporations, such as Enron, Tyco, 
Adelphia, and WorldCom, employed irregular accounting practices, 
published deceptive financial statements, and committed outright fraud.  
After stock prices plummeted and some corporations declared bankruptcy, 
America experienced “a loss of hundreds and hundreds of billions, indeed 
trillions of dollars in market value.”35  The damage could be measured 
objectively in terms of ruined financial portfolios, lost jobs, and failed 
pensions.  But the damage could also be measured more subjectively in 
terms of the public’s lost confidence in financial statements, auditors, and 
America’s financial markets.36 
 
 31. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Eric Martin & Cristina Alesci, “Dow Theory” Says Worst Isn’t Over for U.S. Stocks 
as YRC Falls Drop to 6-Year Law May Spur More Losses, Chart Analysts Say, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 21, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=aMvcBJYDRy4k. 
 34. David Zalubowski, Obama Signs Into Law Plan to Boost Economy, WASHINGTON 
POST, Dec. 18, 2009, at C12. 
 35. Nance Lucas, An Interview With United States Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, 11 J. 
LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 3, 4 (2004), available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NXD/is_1_11/ai_n25101748/print?tag=artBody;coll 
 36. Interestingly, the CRAs were suspected of playing a role in this crisis as well as the 
current crisis because the CRAs rated Enron Corporation as a good credit risk up to four 
days before Enron declared bankruptcy.  Rating the Raters:  Enron and the Credit Rating 
Agencies, Hearings Before the S. Comm on Government Affairs, 107th Cong. 1-4 (2002) 
(statement of Senator Joe Lieberman, Chairman, S. Comm. on Government Affairs).  The 
October 2002 staff report from the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs concluded in 
part that the credit rating agencies failed to exercise sufficient diligence in rating Enron. 
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 Many investors were angered that companies such as Enron were 
able to use such misleading accounting methods and issue fraudulent 
financial statements without earlier detection.  Is it not true that these 
publicly held companies were audited by certified public accountants 
trained to detect accounting irregularities?  And is it not true that 
professional auditors issued reviews each quarter and thorough opinions 
each fiscal year telling the public that the companies’ financial statements 
contained no material misstatements?  Sure.  But it is also true that the pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley accounting profession had morphed over time into an 
industry ripe for major conflicts of interest.  While the profession began as 
one based on independence,37 economic pressures contributed to what 
Senator Paul Sarbanes called one of the main triggers of the crisis:  a lack 
of auditor independence.38 
 The journey from independence to conflicted interests started in the 
1970s when the American Institute for Certified Public Accountants 
(“AICPA”) began to fear antitrust action from the federal government.39  
To decrease this risk, the AICPA removed from its code of conduct40 some 
of the prohibitions against competitive practices.  Consequently, 
competitive bidding for audit projects increased among accounting firms.  
This drove down the price tag, and thus profitability, of audit services. 
 Accounting firms attempted to recapture lost profits by marketing 
ancillary services to their audit clients.  Their efforts were successful:  over 
the next few decades, non-audit services became as bigger moneymakers 
than audit services.  For example, in 2000, more than half of the $52 
million in fees that Enron paid Arthur Andersen was for non-audit work.41  
Not surprisingly, auditors came to depend on their cash-cow ancillary 
 
 37. It was easy for auditors to uphold the concept of independence when the profession 
first developed in Europe in the Nineteenth Century.  An auditor’s main duty was to oversee 
the absentee investments in existing and former colonies.  Consequently, auditors did not 
feel like, nor were they seen as, advocates for the audited entities and investors.  
Additionally, British investors forbade auditors from investing in or working for the 
businesses they audited.  This tradition of auditor independence continued as the profession 
flourished in the United States.  For instance, during the New Deal, auditors’ independence 
strengthened with the creation of the SEC, which furthered the concept of objectivity and 
neutrality.  C. Richard Baker, The Varying Concept of Auditor Independence:  Shifting with 
the Prevailing Environment, THE CPA J. ONLINE, Aug. 2005, 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2005/805/infocus/p22.htm. 
 38. Lucas, supra note 35, at 5. 
 39. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (finding that 
the society of engineers violated the Sherman Act by requiring that its members not engage 
in competitive bidding). 
 40. AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 
2009). 
 41. STAFF TO THE S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107th CONG., FINANCIAL 
OVERSIGHT OF ENRON:  THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 30 (Comm. Print 
2002). 
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services, even though such reliance opened them up to conflicts of interest.  
As a result, the accounting scandals were almost predictable.  Federal laws 
required publicly held companies such as Enron to be audited by 
accountants who signed off on audit opinions.  These accountants, 
however, were paid by their audit clients to write the audit opinions.  
Additionally, the auditors sold to these clients ancillary services which 
were often more profitable than the audit services themselves.  Therefore, 
auditors had good reason to avoid digging too deep into or revealing bad 
news about their clients’ financial statements because angry or bankrupt 
audit clients generally do not buy costly ancillary services from prying 
auditors.  As a Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs staff member 
explained, “it is difficult to comprehend how such large consulting fees 
could not have created a serious conflict of interest for Andersen”42 and 
other audit firms. 
IV.  FORMAL GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION AS THE SOLUTION TO THE 
AUDITORS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 Congress decided that the auditors’ conflicts of interest were a 
major cause, if not the main cause, of the accounting scandals and the 
resulting financial crisis.  Congress reacted to this conclusion by passing 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.43 
Title II of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act establishes strict standards for 
auditor independence in both fact and appearance by focusing on two main 
goals. Sarbanes-Oxley’s first main goal is to limit auditors’ financial 
dependence on their audit clients, using three prohibitions.  First, the Act 
prohibits auditors from providing most of the cash-cow ancillary services 
to their audit clients that they had offered in the past.  The non-audit 
services that Sarbanes-Oxley bans include:  book-keeping; designing 
financial information systems; providing actuarial services; performing 
internal audits; assuming management or human resources functions; and 
providing broker, investment, and legal services.44  Second, the Act 
prohibits auditors from having any direct or material indirect business 
relationships with clients or the officers, directors, or significant 
 
 42. Id. at 22. 
 43. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).  President George W. Bush, who signed 
Sarbanes-Oxley into law, said it included, “‘the most far-reaching reforms of American 
business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.’”  Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush 
Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at C1. 
 44. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 201(a).  The 
Act does, however, allow auditors to provide other non-audit services, such as tax services, 
with preapproval by the company’s audit committee.  Id.  The audit committee’s approval of 
these non-audit services to be performed by the auditor must be disclosed to investors in 
periodic reports.  Id. § 202. 
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shareholders of clients.45  Third, Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits specific financial 
relationships between auditors and their clients, including creditor/debtor, 
broker-dealer, futures commission merchant accounts, insurance products, 
and investment company interests.46 
 Sarbanes-Oxley’s second main goal relating to auditor independence 
is to limit the possibility of collusion between auditors and their clients by 
prohibiting the audit committees of audit clients from approving contingent 
fee agreements or commissions for their audits.47  Additionally, the Act 
requires lead and coordinating audit partners48 and reviewing audit partners 
to rotate off clients at least every five years.49  Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley 
seeks to close the “revolving door” between auditors and audit clients by 
limiting the ways a single individual may work for both an audit firm and 
an audit client of that audit firm.  For example, the Act prohibits registered 
public accounting firms from performing any audit services for a client if 
the CEO, Controller, CFO, or any other high ranking employee of that 
client was employed by the accounting firm and was involved in any 
capacity in that client’s audit for one year prior to the date of the beginning 
of the audit.50 
V.  CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AS THE SOURCES OF THE RECENT FINANCIAL 
CRISES 
 Today, as we once again find the financial market untrustworthy, we 
are reminded of the accounting scandals of the recent past and the resulting 
financial crisis.  Just as the public lost confidence in auditors when the 
auditors issued favorable audit opinions for horribly misleading financial 
statements, so too has the public begun to question the trustworthiness of 
CRAs.51 
 Academics, financial experts, and politicians alike have blamed the 
 
 45. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, AUDIT 
COMMITTEES AND AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE (2007), 
http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/audit042707.htm. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Lead and coordinating audit partners are the partners who have primary 
responsibility for the audit. 
 49. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 203. 
 50. Id. § 206.1.  See also OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, APPLICATION OF THE COMMISSION’S RULES ON AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2007), 
http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/ocafaqaudind080607.htm#prohibited (clarifying the 
prohibitions in Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 51. See, e.g., Thomas Mann Fischer, “Der Dollar fällt gewältig,”  DIE ZEIT, Sept. 20, 
2007, http://www.zeit.de/2007/39/Interview-Rogoff (“I could imagine that Moody’s will 
become the Arthur Andersen of this decade.”). 
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CRAs for the current financial crisis.52  They question how the CRAs could 
have rated subprime RMBS so highly in good faith when the financial 
instruments proved to be such poor investments.  One critic who blames the 
CRAs for the current financial crisis argued that the big three CRAs 
slapped “sterling grades on questionable securities.”53  Another said the 
CRAs “really messed up and led investors to slaughter by not recognizing 
(or perhaps willfully ignoring) risks in the products they rated.”54  And in a 
colorful edition of his monthly note, one financial manager wrote, “You 
were wooed[,] Mr. Moody’s and Mr. Poor’s[,] by the makeup, those six-
inch hooker heels, and a ‘tramp stamp.’  Many of these good looking girls 
are not high-class assets worth 100 cents on the dollar.”55 
 One of the main arguments for blaming the CRAs for the current 
financial crisis is based on the assumption that the CRAs had conflicted 
interests when they rated the subprime RMBS.  There are arguably three 
sources of these conflicts of interest.  All three of these sources mirror the 
sources of conflict the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley auditors faced when they issued 
favorable audit opinions on financial statements for companies like Enron.  
These sources include:  (1) the industry’s changing due to pressure from 
the federal government, (2) the client-pays model, and (3) the marketing of 
ancillary services. 
 Just as the auditing industry was experiencing a dramatic change in 
the 1970s,56 the CRAs’ role in the financial world morphed in reaction to 
governmental forces.  Whereas the auditing industry adjusted due to the 
threat of federal antitrust action, the credit rating industry evolved due to 
new SEC requirements.  Starting in the 1970s, the SEC began requiring 
institutions to receive credit ratings before selling bonds to the investing 
public.  This policy shift created a captive audience for the CRAs’ services.  
In effect, the SEC’s rating requirement changed the role of the CRAs from 
providing protection for investors to advertising for bond sellers.  Thus, just 
as it could be said that auditors switched their focus from investors to audit 
clients, it may appear that “what was once a responsibility to protect buyers 
 
 52. For example, Wharton finance professor Richard J. Herring says that erroneous 
mortgage securities ratings undermined the CRAs’ credibility with other types of ratings, 
making the credit crisis even more problematic. Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules 
Have Any Bite?, supra note 8, at 2. 
 53. David McCann, S&P’s Parent Hires an Ex-E&Y Watchdog, CFO.COM, Jan. 7, 
2009, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12896036/?f=rsspage. 
 54. Ryan E. Freund, Abolish Credit Rating Agencies?  Some Say Yes, ISTOCKANALYST, 
Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.istockanalyst.com/ article/viewarticle/articleid/2929599. 
 55. Gross, supra, note 29. 
 56. The auditing industry underwent a dramatic change in the 1970s when the AICPA 
changed its code of conduct to allow competitive bidding for audit services.  This decreased 
audit profitability and led auditors to market their non-audit services more heavily.  Baker, 
supra, note 37 and accompanying text. 
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often became a responsibility to ensure the bond sellers a more profitable 
product.”57 
 It may also appear that CRAs face a conflict of interest because, like 
auditors, they are paid by the entities they rate.58  Before the 1970s, the 
CRAs sold their ratings directly to and were paid by investors.59  However, 
technology advanced and with it came the use of, and easy access to, 
photocopiers.  Once the CRAs realized that the unauthorized photocopying 
of their ratings manuals would destroy their profitability, they replaced the 
user-pays model with the issuer-pays model.60 
 It might be argued that the issuer-pays model creates a serious 
conflict of interest.  It seems logical that the CRAs, like any other for-profit 
companies, should focus their efforts on pleasing and retaining their paying 
clients.  Furthermore, if the customer is always right, it seems that the 
CRAs’ efforts to please their customers might “conflict with providing 
rating with integrity.”61  The SEC expressed such a worry years before the 
current financial crisis and the popularity of pointing the finger of blame at 
the CRAs.  The SEC stated that the issuer-pays model could tempt CRAs to 
“rate issuers more liberally, and temper their diligence in probing for 
negative information.”62  Other observers, such as the Financial Economics 
Roundtable,63 believe that the issuer-pays model has resulted in issuers 
actively shopping for favorable ratings and refusing to pay for ratings they 
deem “too low.”64  This alleged ratings-shopping might explain why 
Moody’s once changed its rating for a pool of Countrywide Financial 
securities the day after Countrywide complained that the CRA’s rating was 
too tough, even though, allegedly, no new significant information had 
surfaced to cause Moody’s to change its rating.65 
 Finally, it might also be argued that CRAs are plagued by conflicts 
 
 57. Jackie Speier, Credit Rating Agencies Are No Longer First Rate, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, Dec. 17, 2008, at B9, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/12/17/ED0L14P4OC.DTL 
 58. These ratings are then available to the public without charge.  This is known as the 
“issuer pays” model. 
 59. Speier, supra, note 57; Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, 
supra note 8, at 1. 
 60. Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, supra note 8, at 2. 
 61. STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S 
EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 23 (2008). 
 62. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT 
RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS:  AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 
702(B) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 41 (2003). 
 63. The Financial Economists Roundtable is a 15-year-old group of top economists 
from around the world. 
 64. Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, supra note 8, at 3. 
 65. Gretchen Morgenson, The Reckoning; Debt Watchdogs:  Tamed or Caught 
Napping? N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at C1. 
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of interest because they market ancillary services to their clients.  These 
services include rating hypothetical scenarios created by the issuers, 
providing risk management services, and providing consulting services.66  
It is easy to believe that the sale of these ancillary services puts the CRAs 
in the same boat as pre-Sarbanes-Oxley auditors.  There is valid reason to 
worry that, just as Arthur Andersen was motivated to give Enron favorable 
audit opinions in order to ensure a continued stream of revenue from non-
audit services, so too might the CRAs be motivated to give high ratings to 
issuers who purchase ancillary services.67 
VI.  SOLUTIONS TO THE CRAS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 A variety of options have been suggested to cure the CRAs’ 
potential conflicts of interest.  One approach to the alleged CRA problem is 
to eliminate the issuer-pays model.  Two popular suggestions to achieve 
this goal are (1) returning to the traditional user-pays model, and (2) 
instituting of a new model where the general public pays for ratings.68  
There are, however, strong arguments against both of these suggestions.69 
 A different approach to the conflicts of interest involves eliminating 
dependence on CRAs altogether.  Some argue that investors should use 
their own judgment because blind reliance on ratings is what led to 
America’s current financial problems.70  Perhaps, if investors did not have 
credit ratings on which to heedlessly rely, they might have second-guessed 
 
 66. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra, note 62, at 42. 
 67. See, e.g., Letter from Sean J. Egan and W. Bruce Jones, Egan-Jones Rating 
Company, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (November 10, 2002) (“[J]ust as 
accountants were compromised by their consulting assignments, rating firms have similar 
issues.”). 
 68. See, e.g., JEFFREY MANN, RATING RISK AFTER THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS:  A 
USER FEE APPROACH FOR RATING AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY, (2008) (forthcoming in North 
Carolina Law Review).  Because they believe “the world is worse off for the existence of 
companies like Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s,” columnists Michael Lewis and David 
Einhorn wrote, “there should be a rule against issuers paying for ratings. Either investors 
should pay for them privately or, if public ratings are deemed essential, they should be 
publicly provided.”  How to Repair a Broken Financial World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2009, at 
WK10. 
 69. See Josef Forster, The Optimal Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies, in 
DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS 2008, at note 23 (U. Munich, Dep’t of Econ., Discussion 
Papers in Economics No. 5169, 2008) (reiterating that the investor-pays model cannot 
succeed due to technological advances); Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry:  An 
Industrial Organization Analysis (NYU Ctr for Law and Business Research Paper No 01-
001, February 2001) (discussing the efficiency gained from the issuer-pays model). 
 70. Financial blogger Paul Kedrosky recommends not using CRAs at all.  Based on 
Kedrosky’s point that there is no regulatory oversight for equities, professional investment 
adviser Ryan E. Freund asked, “why don’t we just let the private investors rate these 
securities, like they do with equities?”  Freund, supra note 54. 
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the supposed profitability of subprime RMBS.  If there were no credit 
ratings, investors might have done their own research and laughed at the 
prospect of owning a piece of so many houses worth more than the 
homeowners could afford or loans that were supposed to be paid off by 
homeowners with minimal personal credit. 
 The discussions above indicate another option for curing the CRAs 
of their supposed conflicts of interest.  Recall that issuers pay the CRAs for 
credit ratings just as audit clients pay auditors for audit opinions.  
Additionally, CRAs market ancillary services to their rating clients just as 
pre-Sarbanes-Oxley auditors sold ancillary services to their audit clients.  
Finally, the CRAs’ high ratings seem to have contributed to the current 
economic crisis just as the auditors’ favorable audit opinions contributed to 
the financial crisis just a few years ago.  Because the problems with the 
CRAs appear so similar to the problems with auditors before Congress 
passed Sarbanes-Oxley, it seems reasonable to pursue a similar solution.71  
Like the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, it seems logical for either Congress or 
the SEC to spend time and resources regulating the CRAs’ conflicts of 
interest. 
A.  The SEC’s Recent Steps to create a “Sarbanes-Oxley” for CRAs 
 On December 3, 2008 the SEC demonstrated its belief that 
regulation similar to Sarbanes-Oxley was necessary to cure CRAs’ of their 
conflicts of interest and thereby improve the quality of credit ratings.  After 
a ten-month examination of the three largest CRAs,72 the SEC approved 
multiple regulations in the hope of increasing CRA accountability and 
transparency.73  These regulations are discussed below. 
 The Final Amendments to Rule 17g-2(a)(8)74 and Instructions to 
Exhibit 1 of Form NRSRO,75 entitled “Record of Rating Actions,” amends 
paragraph (d) of Rule 17g-2.  They require each CRA recognized by the 
 
 71. One might argue that regulating CRAs is even more necessary than regulating 
auditors because, “in contrast to auditing . . . firms, CRAs so far cannot be made liable for 
consequences of inaccurate credit ratings.  This is because credit ratings are regarded as an 
opinion, comparable to a report in a newspaper.”  Forster, supra note 69, at 16. 
 72. While there are many CRAs based in the United States and abroad, Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”), and Fitch are the three largest.  The credit ratings of these three 
CRAs account for approximately ninety-eight percent of all outstanding ratings issued by 
CRAs recognized by the SEC.  Hunt, supra note 6 at *1, *6.  Such SEC-recognized CRAs 
are called Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, or NRSROs. 
 73. SEC, SEC Approves Measures to Strengthen Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies, 
SEC NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www.sec. gov/news/digest/2008/dig120308.htm. 
 74. Rule 17g-2 under the Exchange Act.  17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2 (2009). 
 75. A “NRSRO,” or Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, is a CRA 
which issues credit ratings that the SEC allows other financial entities to use for certain 
regulatory purposes. 
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SEC (known as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, or 
“NRSROs”) to make publicly available a random sample of ten percent of 
the credit ratings they issue under the issuer-pays model.76  Each NRSRO 
must also make publically available histories for each class of issuer-paid 
credit rating for which the NRSRO is registered and has issued 500 or more 
ratings.  Each NRSRO must publish this information on its corporate 
website and disclose the information’s location on Form NRSRO.77  These 
requirements help the investing public see for which issuers the CRAs 
employ the issuer-pays model.  Investors may then use their own judgment 
to determine whether these specific ratings might be tainted by conflicts of 
interest due to the issuer-pays model. 
 The Final Amendments to Rule 17g-2 create a record-keeping 
requirement triggered when a quantitative model is a substantial component 
of the rating process for a structured financial product.  When this 
requirement is triggered, each NRSRO must keep a record of its rationale 
for any material differences between the credit rating implied by the model 
and the final rating issued by the CRA.78  This requirement allows investors 
to determine when subjective reasons, such as conflicts of interest, might 
have played a role in a final credit rating. 
 The next amendments are certainly reminiscent of Sarbanes-Oxley 
in that they add prohibited conflicts to the list in Rule 17g-5(c).  The first 
amendment limits the CRAs’ ability to sell both rating and non-rating 
services to any given client.  More specifically, the amendment prohibits an 
NRSRO from issuing a credit rating to an issuer or that issuer’s securities 
when the NRSRO, or one of its affiliates, previously made 
recommendations to that issuer about the issuer’s corporate or legal 
structure, assets, liabilities, or activities. 
 The second amendment to the list of prohibited conflicts under Rule 
17g-5(c) bans a NRSRO from issuing a rating if the personnel responsible 
for determining the rating, or developing or approving procedures or 
methodologies used for determining the rating, previously participated in 
determining the fee which the NRSRO charges the related issuer.79  This 
amendment creates a wall between the NRSRO employees who evaluate 
the financial instruments and issuers and the employees who collect money 
 
 76. Requiring public disclosure is a common method of regulation since, “publicity is 
justly commended as a remedy for industrial diseases [and] sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants.”  LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
62 (1914). 
 77. SEC, FACT SHEET:  OPEN MEETING OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/nrsrofactsheet-
120308.htm. 
 78. Id. 
 79. An NRSRO that has too few employees to separate these functions may apply to the 
SEC for an exemption from this requirement. 
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from the issuers.  Such division between functions should prevent CRAs 
from accepting additional compensation in exchange for inflated ratings. 
 The third amendment to Rule 17g-5(c) prohibits NRSROs from 
allowing an employee who participated in determining or monitoring the 
credit rating from receiving gifts from the obligator being rated or from the 
issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of the securities being rated.  While this 
amendment lumps entertainment in the category of prohibited gifts, it 
allows items provided in the context of normal business activities that have 
an aggregate value of no more than twenty-five dollars.80  This amendment 
serves to prevent CRAs from accepting gifts that may cloud their judgment 
when issuing ratings. 
 The next set of amendments, entitled “Re-Proposed Amendments to 
Rule 17g-5,” prohibits an NRSRO from issuing a rating for a structured 
finance product paid for by the product’s issuer unless the information 
provided to the NRSRO to determine the rating is made available to other 
NRSROs.81  These amendments will allow the NRSROs to monitor each 
other when the ratings are provided through the issue-pays model. 
B.  “Sarbanes-Oxley” for CRAs is unnecessary and potentially harmful 
 Some applaud the SEC’s new regulations, believing they are 
necessary to reduce, and hopefully eliminate, any conflicts of interests the 
CRAs face.  The Investment Company Institute is one such enthusiast.  
Paul Schott Stevens, the Investment Company Institute’s President and 
CEO, explained that the organization “welcome[s] reforms that will make 
the rating process more transparent and objective and that will disclose 
potential conflicts that could play a role in a credit rating agency’s 
determination of a rating.”82  Other advocates of CRA regulation83 believe 
that the SEC has started well but would be wise to impose even more 
 
 80. FACT SHEET, supra note 77. 
 81. Id.  See, e.g., Forster, supra note 72, at 22 (explaining that, “while interaction 
between the issuer of a traditional debt security and the CRA are rather limited,” 
interactions between issuers of structured finance transactions and CRAs are more involved.  
In rating structured finance transactions and products, CRAs not only offer rating services, 
but also additional consulting services). 
 82. Investment Company Institute, ICI Commends SEC Approval of Credit-Rating 
Agency Rules:  Investors will Benefit by Improved Disclosure, Transparency, Dec. 3, 2008, 
http://www.ici.org/fcr/ 08_news_sec_cra2.html.  The Investment Institute Company, or ICI, 
is a national trade association of mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, closed-end funds, 
and unit investment funds.  The ICI is also an active participant in the legislative activity 
relating to CRAs. 
 83. One such fan of regulation is Jochen Sanio, the chairman of the German federal 
financial supervision authority (Ban), who called CRAs the largest uncontrolled power in 
the international financial system.  Forster, supra note 69, at 32. 
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regulations on CRAs.84 
 Other parties, including this author, believe that these regulations 
will not play a part in any successful solution to the economic problems 
that the American financial markets currently face. 
Numerous arguments support the notion that increased regulation of 
the CRAs will not solve the current financial crisis and likely would not 
have prevented the crisis if they had been implemented sooner. 
First, regulation, in general, can be harmful.  Opponents to formal 
governmental regulation claim that regulation puts the United States at a 
competitive disadvantage in the global economy.  For example, one could 
argue that Sarbanes-Oxley weakened America’s leadership in the financial 
service industry85 because the restrictions the legislation imposed greatly 
increased the cost of performing audits.  Rather than completely 
internalizing the increased costs, auditors have passed much of the costs 
onto the clients, which they audit.  American companies requiring an audit 
under Sarbanes-Oxley are therefore forced to absorb these costs.  
Consequently, the companies must reduce other costs or charge customers 
more for their goods and services in order to pay for their larger audit 
expenses.  No matter how the American companies choose to deal with 
their high audit costs, they are at a disadvantage when compared to their 
international competitors who do not face similarly high audit costs. 
The same argument could be made regarding regulation of the credit 
rating agencies.  If credit rating agencies face higher costs due to increased 
regulation, then they might charge issuers more for their ratings in order to 
pass on the costs.  American issuers would then be disadvantaged 
compared to foreign issuers, and investment dollars would travel abroad. 
In addition to hurting clients, regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley 
might harm the regulated industries themselves in two significant ways.  
First, regulation reduces the areas in which the industry can profit.  For 
instance, American auditors are at a competitive disadvantage to their 
international counterparts who are still permitted to perform both audit and 
ancillary services for audit clients.  Second, regulations such as Sarbanes-
Oxley can lead to moral bankruptcy.  Regulations may cause regulated 
parties to only ask what is legal, rather than what is ethical.  These 
regulated parties base their ethical decisions simply on what the regulations 
say is legal.86  Clear-cut legal rules can also lead to manipulative behavior, 
 
 84. KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, supra note 8, at 1. 
 85. A Mckinsey & Company study, commissioned by New York City Mayor 
Bloomberg and New York Senator Charles Schumer, cites this as one reason that America's 
financial sector is losing market share to other financial centers around the world.  CITY OF 
NEW YORK & U.S. SENATE, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
SERVICES LEADERSHIP 12 (2007). 
 86. JOHN C. MAXWELL, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS “BUSINESS” ETHICS:  THERE’S 
ONLY ONE RULE FOR MAKING DECISIONS (2003). 
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where regulated parties follow the letter, but not the spirit, of the law. 
 While regulation may be viewed as a general problem, it is more 
specifically detrimental to the CRA industry and the U.S. economy today.  
In passing the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006,87 Congress 
wished to promote competition in the credit rating industry.  However, 
increased SEC regulation will increase the cost of doing business and 
reduce opportunities for high profit margins, just as Sarbanes-Oxley did for 
auditors.  This will, in turn, discourage CRAs from applying for NRSRO 
status,88 thereby thwarting a congressional goal for the industry. 
Also, regulation creates additional cost.  Auditors passed much of the 
costs created by Sarbanes-Oxley onto their clients.  Given today’s even 
weaker economy, it would come as little surprise if the CRAs passed the 
costs created by the new regulations onto their clients, the issuers.  Such 
behavior would have two effects:  first, it would discourage larger issuers 
from seeking multiple ratings, and for smaller issuers, from seeking a 
single credit rating.89  This lack of ratings could further deteriorate the 
public’s confidence in the American financial market.  Second, the issuers 
who do purchase credit ratings will either internalize the cost or pass the 
cost on to investors.  Neither issuers nor investors can withstand this extra 
cost in the current economy.  Thus, this formal regulation will do more 
harm than good and is simply not what America needs at this time. 
 Even if one were to successfully argue that formal governmental 
regulation of the CRAs would not further weaken the already-bleeding 
economy, regulation is simply unnecessary at the current time.  The CRAs 
do not need further Congressional or SEC regulation because the conflicts 
of interest the CRAs face are very minor, if not insignificant.  While the 
CRAs initial high ratings and subsequent downgrading of subprime RMBS 
helped create our current economic crisis, the CRAs’ conflicts of interest 
are not to blame.  The conflicts simply are not great enough to have caused 
the CRAs to issue favorable ratings when the CRAs believed otherwise.  
Additionally, other mechanisms already exist to prevent these small 
conflicts of interest from having any significant effects on the credit rating 
process. 
 
 
 87. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 780-87 (2006).  The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 
requires the SEC to establish clear guidelines for determining which CRAs qualify as 
NRSROs.  Furthermore, the Act gives the SEC the power to regulate NRSROs’ processes 
for guarding against conflicts of interest. 
 88. Letter from Richard M. Whiting, Executive Director and General Counsel of The 
Financial Services Roundtable, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y of Securities and Exchange 
Commission (March 12, 2007), available at http://www.fsround.org/policy/regulatory/ 
pdfs/CreditRatingAgency.pdf. 
 89. Id. 
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C.  CRAs’ Insignificant Conflicts of Interest 
 The American economy, financial market, and housing market 
currently face immense problems.  Relatively, the CRAs’ conflicts of 
interest are only minor predicaments.  This can easily be seen when CRAs 
are more closely compared with auditors.  Because the CRAs do not face 
substantial conflicts of interest, the SEC and Congress should use their time 
to solve more pressing economic problems. 
 Like auditors, CRAs are paid by the clients they evaluate.  However, 
unlike the client-pays model’s effect on audit opinions, the model’s effect 
on the rating of subprime RMBS has been slight.  This is true because, as 
the numbers indicate, no single issuer holds enough financial leverage over 
any CRA to make inflating a credit rating worthwhile for a CRA.  Only a 
small number of CRAs are NRSROs.90  Additionally, any given issuer can 
offer hundreds of different financial instruments.  As a result, each 
NRSRO91 rates thousands of different financial instruments and has 
thousands of different credit rating clients.92  Although at the time of the 
accounting scandals there were only five “big” accounting firms,93 there 
were thousands of Certified Public Accountants qualified to audit 
publically traded companies.  Thus, while large public companies sought 
audit services from the big five accounting firms, the thousands of other 
companies in need of audit opinions turned to the often less expensive 
smaller audit firms and sole practitioners. 
Thus, the audit client-to-auditor ratio was lower than the credit rating 
client-to-CRA ratio.  These ratios indicate that before Sarbanes-Oxley an 
accounting firm could derive a large proportion of its total revenues from a 
single client.  This was the case with the accounting firm Arthur Andersen 
and its client Enron.  Andersen earned more than $50 million from Enron 
in 2000.  One former Andersen partner even predicted that Enron fees 
could have reached $100 million-per-year.94  The large sums of money 
 
 90. The number of NRSROs has fluctuated over the years.  In 1975, the SEC 
recognized three – S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch.  Since 1975, the SEC staff has added six other 
CRAs.  These include Dominion Bond Rating Service in 2003, A.M. Best in 2005, Japan 
Credit Rating Agency, Ltd., Ratings and Investment Information, Inc. in 2007, and Egan-
Jones Rating Company. 
 91. Especially Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch, who received much criticism 
and are the main targets of the new SEC regulations. 
 92. For example, Moody’s rates more than 135,000 finance securities, 65,000 public 
finance obligations, 10,000 corporate and financial institutional relationships, and 100 
sovereign nations.  LUBOMIR DUBECKY, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO MOODY’S RATING 
SERVICE 3 (2006). 
 93. These firms were Arthur Andersen, Deloitte and Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
and Price Waterhouse Coopers. 
 94. MAX H. BAZERMAN & MICHAEL WATKINS, PREDICTABLE SURPRISES:  THE 
DISASTERS YOU SHOULD HAVE SEEN COMING, AND HOW TO PREVENT THEM 61 (Harvard 
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Andersen received from Enron made it extremely difficult for Andersen 
employees to view Enron objectively.  They knew that if the firm lost 
Enron as a client, Andersen would lose a large portion of its total revenue.  
Andersen employees were therefore motivated to keep Enron afloat and 
happy.  This was accomplished, until 2001, by Andersen’s issuance of 
favorable audit opinions for Enron and their simultaneous negligent 
oversight (or purposeful ignorance) of accounting irregularities and fraud. 
 By contrast, the relationships between CRAs and their clients are 
much less involved.  Fees from the average credit rating client constitute 
only a small fraction of each CRA’s total revenue.  In fact, no single rating 
client is likely to contribute more than two percent of any CRA’s total 
revenue.95  Consequently, it would be illogical for a CRA to inflate a rating 
for the sake of saving its business relationship with a single issuer.  The 
financial payoff is not worth the potential harm to the CRA’s reputation.  
The client-pays model therefore poses a less significant problem for the 
CRAs than it did for pre-Sarbanes-Oxley auditors. 
 Just as the issuer-pays model is not a significant problem for the 
CRAs, neither is the fact that the CRAs market ancillary services to their 
rating clients.  Once again, the numbers differentiate the CRAs and the 
conflicted pre-Sarbanes-Oxley auditors.  Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, some 
audit clients paid their auditor more for non-audit services than for their 
annual audits and quarterly reviews.96  Such an imbalance in favor of 
ancillary services does not occur with the CRAs.  Services other than 
traditional credit ratings account for only a small part of each CRA’s 
business.  Because ancillary services account for a “very small portion of 
their [the CRAs’] total revenues,” most experts find the conflict of interest 
created from these services to be “manageable.”97 
D.  Self-Regulation Makes Government Regulation Unnecessary 
 In addition to the CRAs’ conflicts of interest being minor, they are 
also already regulated by the CRAs themselves.  Therefore, Congress need 
not step in and regulate. 
 The CRAs are proactive and self-regulate largely due to their 
business model.  CRAs are only successful so long as their ratings are 
deemed reliable.  If investors began to doubt the quality of a specific 
 
Business School Pub. Corp. 2004).  See also Flynn McRoberts, Ties to Enron Blinded 
Andersen, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 3, 2002, at A1. 
 95. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 23.  See also id. at 
41 (explaining that no single issuer or issuer group represents more than two percent of 
S&P’s annual revenue from its rating business). 
 96. See Bazerman and Watkins, supra note 94. 
 97. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 23. 
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CRA’s ratings, they would either stop buying financial products rated by 
that CRA, or they would find a new way to evaluate the creditworthiness of 
the products.  In either scenario, the CRA’s clients would cease to be 
clients once they realized that the public no longer trusted the CRA’s 
ratings.  Unless legally required to get a rating, companies would have little 
impetus to pay for a rating that investors ignored.  Thus, a CRA’s survival 
is largely dependent on its reputation for issuing credible and reliable credit 
ratings.98 
 The same relationship between the perception of reliability and 
success holds true for auditors.  Once an auditor loses the public’s trust, his 
career is essentially ended.  Audit opinions have value because they are 
believed to be honest evaluations of companies’ financial statements from a 
trustworthy outsider.  An audit opinion from a questionable auditor is 
therefore worthless.  The downfall of Arthur Andersen proves this 
assertion.  Andersen was not forced by a court or the SEC to close its 
doors.  In fact, the Supreme Court pardoned the accounting firm on behalf 
of the Enron case.  However, even though Andersen was permitted to 
continue auditing, it chose to cease operating as a firm because its 
reputation was damaged beyond repair.  Because there had been so many 
questions about the integrity of Andersen’s audit opinions, companies had 
no interest in paying for an Andersen stamp of approval to display to the 
investing public.  The reaction of stock prices to Anderson’s downfall also 
proves this assertion.  Andersen audit clients faced larger negative stock 
returns than non-Andersen audit clients after the public learned about 
Enron and Andersen’s shredding of documents.99 Andersen audit opinions 
were not only worthless in attracting investor confidence, but perhaps even 
harmful to potential audit clients.  Andersen’s auditing career ended as 
soon as the public began to question the firm’s trustworthiness. 
 The reputational capital model explains the strong link between the 
public’s perception of a firm and the firm’s success.100  The reputational 
capital model, as it relates to the CRAs, explains that CRAs are extremely 
resistant to jeopardizing their reputations for fear of losing future business.  
Thus, despite the issuer-pays model, CRAs resist the temptation to bend to 
clients’ wills and inflate ratings in order to satisfy customers.  Doing so 
 
 98. Id. at 42. 
 99. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Callen & Mindy Morel, The Enron-Andersen Debacle:  Do 
Equity Markets React to Auditor Reputation? (Joseph L. Rotman School of Management 
Research Paper Series, 2002) (comparing the daily stock returns of a sample of Andersen 
audit clients with those of a control sample of big five non-Andersen audit clients during the 
months of October 2001 through January 2002); Paul K. Chaney & Kirk L. Philipich, The 
Shredded Reputation:  The Cost of Audit Failure, 40 J. OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 1221 
(2002). 
 100. For an in-depth discussion of the reputational capital model as it relates to the 
CRAs, see, for example, Hunt, supra note 5. 
NEUMANFINAL[1] 6/1/2010  10:40:38 AM 
944 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
would put the CRAs’ reputations, and consequently, their whole future 
success, in great jeopardy. 
 In order to protect their reputations, CRAs regulate themselves and 
successfully limit their conflicts of interest.  First, the CRAs have enacted 
detailed policies and procedures to ensure that the issuer-pays model does 
not affect their judgment as it affected Arthur Andersen’s.  First, the CRAs 
have strict rules regarding analyst compensation in order to prevent 
potential interference with the objectivity of the analysts’ ratings.101  These 
procedures have historically been successful, as seen when a Senate 
Committee staff report concluded that Moody’s did not base the timing of 
its downgrade of Enron’s credit rating on any improper influence, as many 
suspected.102  The report found that Moody’s adjusted its rating because 
new information caused the CRA to change its view of Enron’s 
circumstances.103 
 Second, in order to limit the influence that ancillary services might 
have on credit ratings, the CRAs have created firewalls to separate the 
ratings business from non-rating services.104  Thus, rating analysts are 
generally prevented from marketing ancillary services to credit rating 
clients.105  In fact, the CRAs generally employ separate staffs to sell rating 
and non-rating services.106  Non-rating analysts have no reason to concern 
themselves with a client’s reaction to a low credit rating.  Additionally, the 
performance of non-rating businesses does not directly impact rating 
analysts’ compensation.107 
 Currently, the CRAs are implementing even more regulations to 
ensure they are not tempted by conflicts of interest.  This is evidenced by 
the steps taken by one of the three largest American CRAs:  S&P.  S&P’s 
parent corporation recently announced that “S&P is committed to helping 
restore confidence and transparency in the credit markets.”108  To do so, 
S&P has taken action to enhance its rating process.  The CRA has 
implemented an analyst rotation program109 reminiscent of the audit partner 
rotations required under Sarbanes-Oxley.  Furthermore, S&P created a risk 
 
 101. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 42. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. “Fees from any single issuer typically comprise a very small percentage—less than 
1%— of a rating agency’s total revenue.  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
supra note 62, at 42.  See also Letter from Richard M. Whiting, supra note 88, at 2 (arguing 
that certain proposed rules intended by the SEC to implement provisions of the Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 were “unnecessary”). 
 105. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 43. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. McCann, supra note 53. 
 109. Id. 
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oversight committee and increased data requirements for certain issuers.110  
S&P has also taken a page from audit clients’ books and created an internal 
monitoring position.  S&P’s parent company hired a former Ernst & Young 
executive111 who will report directly to the S&P’s parent company’s 
chairman and CEO.112 
 All of S&P’s safeguards demonstrate that although the CRAs 
already had sufficient safeguards in place to ensure they were not 
improperly influenced by the issuer-pays model or the sale of non-rating 
services, the CRAs are currently implementing additional measures to 
further limit any conflicts of interest, discover any problems, and increase 
investor confidence. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 Like pre-Sarbanes-Oxley auditors, the CRAs employ the client-pays 
model and sell ancillary services to the clients they evaluate.  While formal 
governmental regulation of the auditing industry was necessary to restore 
public trust and eliminate large conflicts of interest, such regulation is not 
necessary to cure the CRAs’ conflicts of interest.  Not only are the CRAs’ 
conflicts of interest insignificant, but the CRAs’ effective self-regulation 
protects the integrity of their rating processes. 
 If conflicts of interests truly were a problem for the CRAs, there 
would have been indications in the past.  The issuer-pays model has been 
an integral part of the credit rating industry for decades.  CRAs have also 
sold ancillary services to their rating clients for many years.  Thus, if 
conflicts of interest were, in fact, a problem for the CRAs, the dilemma 
“should have shown up in corporate and muni ratings at some point in the 
past 35 years – [however,] it simply hasn’t, at least not in any statistically 
significant fashion.”113 
 It is hard to ignore, however, the role the CRAs played in the current 
financial crisis.  They initially rated the subprime RMBS highly, 
motivating investors to purchase these toxic assets.  If the CRAs had 
correctly rated the securities initially, then perhaps investors would have 
seen the subprime RMBS for the junk instruments that they were.  But 
these faulty ratings should be attributed to the CRAs’ inexperience, not a 
lack of good faith.  The CRAs were evaluating highly innovative asset sub-
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Groves served as chairman and CEO of Ernst & Young for seventeen years.  He 
later served as chairman of both Legg Mason Merchant Banking and Marsh Inc.  Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Posting of “Bondboy” to Blaming the Rating Agencies:  Too Convenient, 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/113687-blaming-the-ratings-agencies-too-convenient (Jan. 
7, 2009, 19:33 EST).  “Bondboy” writes that he worked in the bond business for 
approximately thirty years and is now retired. 
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classes that had never been through a down cycle.114  Like the banks, 
investors, regulators, and the vast majority of economists, the CRAs 
honestly believed that the subprime RMBS were good investments.  Like 
everyone else, the CRAs thought that mortgage defaults and home 
foreclosures would be captured in the most junior tranches of the securities, 
which were priced accordingly to reflect that risk.  As a result, the CRAs 
cannot be blamed for failing to see the housing bubble for what is was, nor 
can they be blamed for failing to predict when the bubble would pop.  The 
CRAs simply did their job in good faith using the little information 
available to them.  As such, the CRAs differentiated themselves from pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley auditors and do not need to be regulated in a similar 
fashion. 
 
 
 
 
 114. David Merkel, Blaming the Rating Agencies:  Too Convenient, SEEKING ALPHA 
(Jan. 7, 2009), http://seekingalpha.com/article/113687-blaming-the-ratings-agencies-too-
convenient. 
